All-Hazards Risk and Resilience Assessment for Wastewater Utilities

NJWEA 2022 Annual Conference

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May 9, 2022



Agenda

- Introduction
- Methodology
- Risk and Resilience Project
 Framework
- Fauquier County Water & Sewer Authority Example
- Conclusion
- Q&A



www.epa.gov/waterresilience



Introduction

Risk and Resilience

ars TECHNICA

Feds say man broke into public water system and shut down safety processes

TECH SCIENCE BOLICY CARS GAMING & CUI

Indictment underscores the potential for remote intrusions to have fatal consequences. $\label{eq:DAN GOODIN-4/1/2021, 4:07 PM}$





Alerts and Tips Resources Report

National Cyber Awareness System > Alerts > Compromise of U.S. Water Treatment Facility

Alert (AA21-042A)

Compromise of U.S. Water Treatment Facility

Original release date: February 11, 2021 | Last revised: February 12, 2021

Print Tweet Send Share

Summary



Fort Frances crews attempt to pump water out of the White Pine Lift Station, which stopped working during the weekend's storm. The exact problem hasn't been identified, as crews have been unable to access the pump to find out why it stopped working. (Craig Miller/Provided)


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More Alert

CISA.gov

America's Water Infrastructure Act (AWIA)


- Signed: October 23, 2018 and amends the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)
- New requirements:
 - 1. Risk and Resilience Assessment
 - 2. Emergency Response Plan
- Community water systems serving over 3,300 people (directly or indirectly)
- Update/certify **both** documents every five years



Emergency Response Plan

No later than six months after certifying the Risk and Resilience Assessment (June 30, 2020)

Purpose of All Hazards Risk and Resilience Assessments






Methodology

Risk & Resilience Assessment Methodology

Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection

- 1. Asset Characterization
- 2. Threat Characterization
- 3. <u>Consequence Analysis</u>
- 4. <u>V</u>ulnerability Analysis
- 5. <u>Threat Analysis (Likelihood)</u>
- 6. Risk Analysis (R=<u>C×V×T</u>)
- 7. Risk Management (B:C)

Result: Quantified Risk Scores



Risk & Resilience Assessment Methodology Risk (\$) = Threat Likelihood (%) x Consequence (\$) x Vulnerability (%)

Threat Likelihood (%)

• How likely a given threat is to occur in a given year; a percentage value ranging from nearly zero (very unlikely to occur) to one (almost certain to occur).

Consequence (\$)

- The worst reasonable consequence to an asset, assuming a threat does occur; a dollar value.
- For most threats: Consequence = Cost of Temporary Measure/ Equipment + Cost from Fatalities + Cost from Injuries + Repair/Replacement

Vulnerability (%)

- An assessment of the utility's preparedness ahead of time for the threat, whether it will be able to respond during or immediately after the threat, and if the utility would be able to fully recover from the threat; a percentage value ranging from 0.001 (least vulnerable) to 1 (most vulnerable).
- For most threats: Vulnerability = Preparedness x Active Response x Recovery

Values from EPA, FEMA or AWWA guidance.

 Values will be determined based on: workshop input, data collected, site visits, engineering judgement, best practices

Risk & Resilience Assessment Methodology

CDM Smith's Risk and Resilience RRA Tool

Risk and Resilience Assessment (RRA) Tool


to facilitate compliance with

America's Water Infrastructure Act (AWIA)

Assault on Utility - Physical: Threat Likelihood x Consequence x Vulnerability = Risk*												Disclaimer					
Nykysiaet saavalt on oliitty jairaalaastaa on oleittä ville toi jalait oli kuuktine jairaalaan valtaa											The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report and Client's						
										implementation of any recommended changes are meant to reduce the risk to the Client's facilities							
			Thread											from natural hazards and malevolent acts but will not eliminate the risk entirely. CDM Smith does			
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								[malevolent acts and natural hazards as required by AWIA based on existing measures in place			
						_								related to preparedness, active response, and recovery. Each threat-specific risk assessment is			
														located in an individual tab to allow the user to choose which threats to assess. Once all relevant			
				Par									L 🛏	risk assessments have been completed, the Risk Summary tab provides an overview of the critical			
														assets that are most at risk and to which threat. The Utility Resilience Index includes a utility-wide			
				Annanff allank wilk an 🔪										resilience score to reflect the utility's overall ability to absorb or cope with an incident. The tool			
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
Risk & Resilience Assessment Project Framework



Data Gathering and Review


- GIS/asset management program for water system assets
- Locations and facility descriptions of water system assets
- Near-term capital projects
- As-built drawings of critical facilities
- Past events (e.g., after-action reports)
- Local hazard mitigation plans
- Previously prepared vulnerability or risk assessments
- Previously prepared Business Continuity and/ or Emergency Response Plans (ERP) and associated annexes.

Data Collection & Review



Threats: Malevolent Acts*

- Assault on Utility Physical
- Theft or Diversion Physical
- Contamination
- Sabotage Physical
- Cyber Attack
 - Business Enterprise Systems
 - Process Control Systems





Threats: Natural Hazards*

Threat Asset Pairing

- Drought
- Earthquake
- Extreme temperatures (heat and cold)
- Flooding
- Pandemic
- Wind related hazards
- Wildfires




^{*2018} Rappahannock-Rapidan Hazard Mitigation Plan: <u>www.madisonco.virginia.gov</u>

²⁰¹⁸ Commonwealth of Virginia Hazard Mitigation Plan: https://www.cakex.org/sites/default/files/documents/COV-SHMP-3-2018-Public.pdf

Asset Types

- Operations-Treatment
 - Wastewater treatment plants and related assets (shop areas, plant buildings, etc.)
 - Power supply
- Operations-Collection
 - Collection piping
 - Lift stations
- Operations Personnel
- Finance and Accounting
 - Billing, payroll, third-party suppliers
 - Personnel
- Information Technology
 - SCADA
 - Enterprise Servers & laptops/ workstations





Example of a Threat-Asset Pair

Threat Asset Pairing

 Asset: Bat Computer
 (which includes the SCADA system for the Bat Cave!)



 Threat: Cyber Attack or on Control Systems



Threat-Asset Pairs

List of Typical Assets

- Wastewater Treatment Plants
- Pump & Lift Stations
- Power Supply (Incl. Back Up Power)
- Collection & Conveyance
- Administrative Buildings & Maintenance Facilities
- SCADA
- IT & Communication Systems
- Personnel

Threat Asset Pairing

Natural Hazards

- Pandemic
- Drought
- Extreme temperatures (Heat & Cold)
- Flooding
- Wind events
- Wildfires
- Earthquakes

Malevolent Acts (recommended by EPA)

- Assault on Utility
- Contamination
- Cyber Attack
 - Business Enterprise Systems
 - Process Control Systems
- Sabotage

Theft or Diversion


Develop Threat-Asset Pairs Matrix

Crit	ical Wastewater Assets		Male	evolent Ac	ts			Natural Hazards			Pairing	
			Referen	ce Threats		Reference Threats						
		Mala	evolent Threats (Base		onesies)							
		IVIdit			egoriesj	Natural Hazards*						
Asset ID	Asset Name	Assault on Utility - Physical	Contamination of Wastewater	Cyber Attack on Business Enterprise Systems	Cyber Attack on Process Control Systems	Sabotage - Physical	Theft/Diversion	Drought v	Earthquake 🔻	Extreme Temperature	Flooding and Heavy Rainfall	Major Storms
Operations - Treatment: 1	Marshall WWTP-Headworks	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Operations - Treatment: 2	Marshall WWTP-Equalization Basin	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A	Yes	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Operations - Treatment: 3	Marshall WWTP- Nitrification Reactors & Secondary Clarifiers	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Operations - Treatment: 4	Marshall WWTP- UV Disinfection and Cascade Aeration	Yes	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Operations - Treatment: 5	Marshall WWTP- Chemicals & Chemical Feed Systems	Yes	N/A	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes
Operations - Treatment: 6	Marshall WWTP-Outfall & Effluent Pipeline	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	No	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A
Operations - Treatment: 7	Marshall WWTP-Solids Handling	Yes	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Operations - Treatment: 8	Marshall WWTP-Back Up Power	No	N/A	N/A	▼ N/A	Yes	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes
Operations - Treatment: 9	Vint Hill WWTP- Influent PS (New Baltimore PS #2)	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A	Yes	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes
Operations - Treatment: 10	Vint Hill WWTP- Headworks	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Operations - Treatment: 11	Vint Hill WWTP- Sequencing Batch Reactors & Post Equalization	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Operations - Treatment: 12	Vint Hill WWTP-Filtration and Aeration	Yes	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Operations - Treatment: 13	Vint Hill WWTP- UV Disinfection	Yes	N/A	N/A	N/A	Yes	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Operations - Treatment: 14	Vint Hill WWTP- Chemicals & Chemical Feed Systems	Yes	N/A	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes
Operations - Treatment: 15	Vint Hill WWTP-Sludge Stabilization & Dewatering	Yes	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Operations - Treatment: 16	Vint Hill WWTP- Outfall, Effluent Pipe	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Yes	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A
Operations - Treatment: 17	Vint Hill WWTP- Back Up Power	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	Yes	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes
Operations - Treatment: 18	Remington WWTP- Preliminary Treatment & Septage Receiving	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Operations - Treatment: 19	Remington WWTP- Aeration Tanks (Schrieber Tanks) & Secondary Clarifiers	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Operations - Treatment: 20	Remington WWTP Post Aeration	Yes	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Operations - Treatment: 21	Remington WWTP-Disinfection & Effluent Monitoring	Yes	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Operations - Treatment: 22	Remington WWTP- Chemicals & Chemical Feed Systems	Yes	N/A	N/A	N/A	15	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes
Operations - Treatment: 23	Remington WWTP- Outfall & Effluent Pipe	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A
Operations - Treatment: 24	Remington WWTP-Solids Handling Systems	Yes	N/A	N/A	Yes		N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Operations - Treatment: 25	Remington WWTP-Back Up Power	No	N/A	N/A	N/A		N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes

For every critical asset, identify which threats have a potential High-Consequence: Yes, No, TBD


Threat

Asset



Which malevolent acts or natural hazards are you most concerned about?

Stakeholder Engagement Workshops



"Attack on our treatment facility, we are in a remote area"

"Physical damage or harm to people and property"

"Security of facilities has been ignored for years, unless there is a forced project."

Stakeholder Engagement Workshops

Put your Leadership Hat on and think into the future...

- What critical assets are most vulnerable in your opinion?
- Why and how are they vulnerable?
- Based on these vulnerabilities, what are the possible "worst reasonable case" consequences that could occur?






Stakeholder Engagement Workshops

- Document how past events challenged the system?
- Capture and document
 Institutional Knowledge
- Consider "What if" impacts beyond recent experience to fully understand the impact of specific threats on utility business functions



Stakeholder Engagement Workshops





Case Study: Fauquier County

Utility Overview

- Fauquier County Water and Sanitation Authority
- 4,600 service connections
- 96 miles of sanitary sewer mains
- Fifteen (15) sanitary sewer lift stations
- Three (3) main systems
 - Marshall
 - Remington
 - Vint Hill



Risk & Resilience Assessment



Assets

- Operations-Treatment
 - 3 wastewater treatment plants and related assets (shop areas, plant buildings, etc.)
 - Power supply
- Operations-Collection
 - Collection piping
 - 15 Lift stations
- Operations Personnel
- Finance and Accounting
 - Billing, payroll, third-party suppliers
 - Personnel
- Information Technology
 - SCADA
 - Enterprise Servers & laptops/ workstations

1°=23' 10' 0 20' 40







Threats

Malevolent Acts:

- Assault on Utility Physical
- Contamination
- Theft or Diversion Physical
- Cyber Attack
 - Business Enterprise Systems
 - Process Control Systems
- Sabotage Physical

Natural Hazards:

- Drought
- Earthquake
- Extreme temperatures (heat and cold)
- Flooding
- Pandemic
- Wind related hazards



Threat Asset Pairs

Response Team Asset Grouping	Total Assets	Top / High Criticality Assets				
Operations - Treatment	38	35				
Operations – Conveyance	21	21				
Finance and Accounting	6	5				
Information Technology	14	13				
	79 Total	74 Evaluated				

Total of

- 74 Critical Assets Evaluated
- 421 "Threat Asset Pairs" Evaluated



Example Calculation – Sabotage on Wastewater Lift Station

Threat Likelihood

• Threat likelihood is 0.05

Consequence (\$)

- The **worst-case scenario** is intentional sabotage or damage of pump controls or other pump equipment. Perpetrated by insider or outsider.
- Temporary measure: FCWSA temporary bypass pump can be installed while pump is rehabilitated.

60 days of downtime
\$0 cost of temporary measure
\$110,000 repair/ replacement costs

• EPA Guidance

Example Calculation – Sabotage on Wastewater Lift Station

Threat Likelihood (%)

•Threat likelihood is 0.05

Consequence (\$)

- •The **worst-case scenario** is intentional sabotage or damage of pump controls or other pump equipment. Perpetrated by insider or outsider.
- Temporary measure: FCWSA temporary bypass pump can be installed while pump is rehabilitated.

Vulnerability (%)

• Vulnerability = Preparedness x Active Response x Recovery

• Preparedness: This site is not secured with a fence; lift station is not housed in a building; an intruder would have full access to every control panel; locks on the wet well hatches and control panel; site is equipped with an alarm system; two pumps are required to handle the average flow.

•Active Response: Use temporary bypass pump until pump station operation can resume; generator is at the site with sufficient fuel for a week; FCWSA has contracts with electricians, septage haulers, generator vendors and SCADA contractor.

• Recovery: Total recovery is anticipated.



 60 days of downtime


- \$0 cost of
- temporary measure
- \$110,000 repair/

replacement costs

- Little preparation
- Strong response
- Strong recovery

Risk Score: \$55

Example Calculation – Sabotage on Wastewater Lift Station



• 1.0%

Likelihood

Threat Likelihood (%)

• Lift Station is in the 100-year FEMA floodplain



Threat Likelihood (%)

• Lift Station is in the 100-year FEMA floodplain

Consequence (\$)

• Damage to above ground equipment, in particular pump motors and electrical equipment



Threat Likelihood (%)

• Lift Station is in the 100-year FEMA floodplain

Consequence (\$)

• Damage to above ground equipment, in particular pump motors and electrical equipment

Vulnerability (%)

- Vulnerability = Preparedness x Active Response x Recovery
- Preparedness: Electrical equipment is in electrical building and elevated; back-up generator is on site; no additional flood protection measures on site.
- Active Response: If damaged use temporary bypass pump until pump station operation can resume; generator is at the site with sufficient fuel for a week; FCWSA has contracts with electricians, septage haulers, generator vendors
- Recovery: Total recovery is anticipated.


• 1.0% Likelihood

7 Days downtime,
\$0 cost of temporary measure
\$220,000 repair/ replacement costs

Moderate
 Preparation

- Strong Response
- Strong Recovery

Risk Score: \$110







FCWSA Lessons Learnt

- Natural Hazards typically higher risks due to higher likelihoods compared to malevolent acts
- Assets most at risks are:
 - Personnel
 - Biological treatment of WWTPs
 - Electrical & control equipment
 - Higher criticality lift stations
 - Vint Hill WWTP (batch reactors & post equalization)
- Factors contributing to higher level of preparation & response
 - Cross-training of staff
 - Ability to manually run plants & bypass pump stations
 - Spare parts, back-up power, emergency contracts & temporary pumps



Vint Hill WWTP




Conclusion

Conclusion

A comprehensive risk assessment can...


- Help utilities to identify vulnerabilities and prioritize actions
- Identify risks that are easily reduced or eliminated
- Clarify what is known and unknown about critical assets




Conclusion

A comprehensive risk assessment can...

- Provide an objective basis for decisions on controlling risks
- Provide opportunities for staff engagement and awareness raising
- Provide basis for funding opportunities, for example
 - FEMA funding
 - Bipartisan Infrastructure Bill





"Makes the largest investment in clean drinking water and waste water infrastructure in American history..."



Questions?

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